Published in Scientific Papers. Series "Management, Economic Engineering in Agriculture and rural development", Vol. 25 ISSUE 2
Written by Minko GEORGIEV, Rumena GANDEVA

New Institutional Economics (NIE) posits that economic system improvement can be achieved through incentives for hybrid contractual organizations. In Bulgaria's agricultural sector, the increasing use of public registries (PRs) and their digital formats reduces information asymmetry, facilitates access to property rights, and lowers social costs. Enhanced governance structures are realized through hybrid contractual forms and property rights protection, enabled by the synergy between electronic and physical transactions. These conditions lead to low asset specificity, reduced uncertainty, and high transaction repeatability, characteristic of contractual alternatives with low transaction costs (TrC). However, the redirection of incentives for property rights acquisition by certain actors, who retain ownership rights, absorb cash flows, and reduce TrC, prevents the hybrid contract from achieving its goal of low social costs. This article aims to compare alternatives and test the hypothesis that hybrid technological contracts, exemplified by PRsin agriculture, result in lower social costs. The methods employed include comparative-institutional analysis, discrete structural analysis, and effect analysis. The expected results and conclusions are that the studies are expected to confirm the positive impact of digitalized public registers on the agricultural sector. A concept for improving the institutional environment is proposed.

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